Declaration - Quesnelle Declaration ISO Motion for Order March 10, 2021 (2024)

Case

Lianne Pinkston vs Thien H. Vu D.D.S., Inc. et al

Aug 14, 2024 |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |24CV445179

Case

Gouri Jha vs Suzanne Winter et al

Aug 16, 2024 |Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36) |Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36) |24CV445312

Case

Jason Jones vs AIR PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS INC

Aug 12, 2024 |Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36) |Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36) |24CV444964

Case

ERNESTO HEREDIA vs ERIC GODINEZ

Aug 16, 2024 |Other Employment Limited (15) - under 10,000 |Other Employment Limited (15) - under 10,000 |24CV445285

Case

CECILIA LARA vs EPICUREAN GROUP, a California corporation

Aug 15, 2024 |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |24CV445235

Case

Janeya Thomas vs Intuit Inc et al

Aug 14, 2024 |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |24CV445204

Case

Mahnoor Khan vs Palo Alto Networks, Inc.

Aug 15, 2024 |Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36) |Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36) |24CV445331

Case

David Tovar vs Windsor Property Management Company

Aug 14, 2024 |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |24CV445199

Case

Drake Schmitt vs Maxar Space LLC et al

Aug 15, 2024 |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |24CV445243

Ruling

PULIDO vs REDUX LLC

Aug 13, 2024 |CVRI2304544

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARYCVRI2304544 PULIDO VS REDUX LLC APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTIONSETTLEMENTTentative Ruling: Appearances requested to discuss several issues with compliance with theCMO, including paragraphs G.1, G.3.a,.d,.e,.k, G.4.a,.i, G.5, and G.9. Notice refers to the originalcomplaint but there now a first amended complaint. Objection form states “if you want to beincluded in the . . . settlement . . . do not fill out this form” but an objecting party may want to beincluded in the settlement, but get a better deal. Proposed order (paragraph 14) refers to a claimform, but none is required.

Ruling

Samuel Bernard Johnson vs. California Department of Technology

Aug 13, 2024 |Unlimited Civil (Wrongful Termination) |34-2020-00279945-CU-WT-GDS

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2020-00279945-CU-WT-GDS: Samuel Bernard Johnson III vs. California Department of Technology 08/14/2024 Hearing on Motion for Leave to Amend Answer in Department 53Tentative RulingNOTICE:Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendarmust comply with the following procedure:To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion OralArgument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and adviseopposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mailmessage: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specificmatter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified theopposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoomlink and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomesthe final order of the Court.Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or byvideo conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all otherparties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required,the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings. TheDepartment 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the ZoomMeeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the ZoomMeeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services attheir own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956.Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Temporeavailable on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore byutilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available athttps://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.Pdf.A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed byeach party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from theCourt’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list, Once the form is signed it must be filed with theclerk.If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Requestfor Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Onceapproved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will beprovided.TENTATIVE RULING:Defendants’ motion for leave to file an amended answer to complaint is ruled upon asfollows.Defendants’ notice of motion does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure §1010 orCRC Rule 3.1110(a), requiring the moving parties to state the grounds for the motionpresented. Page 1 of 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2020-00279945-CU-WT-GDS: Samuel Bernard Johnson III vs. California Department of Technology 08/14/2024 Hearing on Motion for Leave to Amend Answer in Department 53Plaintiff’s counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(3).Defendants now move for leave to file a second amended answer to complaint whicheffectively deletes two (2) affirmative defenses that are claimed to have beeninadvertently included in the first amended answer filed on 4/9/2024. According to themoving papers, plaintiff refuses to stipulate to this amendment and this hasnecessitated the present motion.Plaintiff opposes, advancing a variety of arguments including that this motion was “filedand served in bad faith.”At the outset, the Court notes that Defendants seek here only to effectuate what wouldamount to a mere “deletion” of two affirmative defenses and seek no amendments totheir answer other than such “deletion.” Under these circ*mstances, the Court finds noreason why defendants could not have effected the dismissal of the two affirmativedefenses at issue by use of the Judicial Council’s Request for Dismissal form. That is,the mere dismissal of a cause of action or affirmative defense does not require a formalmotion for leave to amend in the first instance. For instance, under existing Californialaw, a plaintiff generally possesses “an absolute right to dismiss” his/her action or anindividual cause of action alleged therein and neither the trial court nor its clerk has anydiscretion in which to deny the right to request. (See, e.g., O’Dell v. Freightliner Corp.(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 645, 659; see also, Weil & Brown (The Rutter Group), CivilProcedure Before Trial (2023), Ch. § 11:6.) Additionally, the filing of a voluntarydismissal of an action or a cause of action automatically terminates the trial court’sjurisdiction over the matter (unless an exception to this general applies). (O’Dell, at659.) It stands to reason that these same principles govern affirmative defenses whichare asserted by a defendant and thus, defendants in the case at bar also generallypossess an equally absolute right to dismiss any or all of the previously-assertedaffirmative defenses, thereby obviating the need to obtain from plaintiff a stipulationsuch dismissal. That is, just as a plaintiff is not required to maintain all of its initially-pled causes of action through trial, a defendant is not required to maintain all of itsinitially-pled affirmative defenses through trial. In short, a plaintiff cannot force adefendant either to allege or to maintain any particular affirmative defense the latterdoes not desire.Although defendants have opted not to utilize the Judicial Council’s Request forDismissal form but have instead filed a noticed motion to amend in order to obtain thevery same relief, this Court will grant the motion for leave to file an amended answerespecially in light of the vast body of California case law which unequivocally holds thatamendments to pleadings are to be granted with great liberality before trial andsometimes even during trial. (See, e.g., Huff v. Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732, Page 2 of 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2020-00279945-CU-WT-GDS: Samuel Bernard Johnson III vs. California Department of Technology 08/14/2024 Hearing on Motion for Leave to Amend Answer in Department 53736.) Here, there is currently no trial date and the amendment sought here relates tothe first amended answer which defendants filed just a few months ago on 4/9/2024.Therefore, coupled with the fact that the amended answer does not seek to add anyallegations or defenses but rather only to delete affirmative defenses which are claimedto have been inadvertently included with the prior amended answer to complaint, thisCourt will exercise its broad discretion in favor of granting the relief sought bydefendants. While plaintiff appears to contest whether the affirmative defenses at issuewere, in fact, inadvertently included, this argument is misplaced in opposition to arequest to effectively dismiss the two affirmative defenses. Again, plaintiff does nothave authority to dictate what defenses will be alleged or maintained against plaintiff’scauses of action. The Court also finds that none of plaintiff’s arguments in oppositionare grounds upon which to force defendant to maintain, litigate and prove at trial theaffirmative defenses at issue.The Court denies defendants’ request for judicial notice relating to orders by the ThirdDistrict Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court relative to this Court’s1/26/2023 discovery order, as these matters are not necessary as support for thepresent motion. Accordingly, the Court need not rule on plaintiff’s objections todefendants’ request for judicial notice.For the reasons explained above, defendants’ motion to amend is GRANTED and theyshall file and serve their proposed Second Amended Answer no later than 8/26/2024.(Although not required by court rule or statute, defendants are plaintiff is directedto present a copy of this order when the amended complaint is presented forfiling.)This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required.(Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.) Page 3 of 3

Ruling

GLENN TIMMONS VS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Aug 15, 2024 |21STCV32561

Case Number: 21STCV32561 Hearing Date: August 15, 2024 Dept: 50 THE COURT NEEDS ADDITIONAL TIME TO REVIEW THE MSJ/MSA. THE CLERK WILL CONTACT THE PARTIES TO DISCUSS A NEW HEARING DATE. THE COURT WILL BE DARK 8/19 THRU 9/3 SO THAT CONTACT WILL LIKELY OCCUR AFTER 9/3.

Ruling

MORGAN CALTON VS PAYQWICK, INC., ET AL.

Aug 21, 2024 |23VECV02319

Case Number: 23VECV02319 Hearing Date: August 21, 2024 Dept: T CALTON V PAYQWICK 23VECV02319 [TENTATIVE] ORDER: Defendant PayQwick, Inc.s Motion for Protective Order Re: Plaintiff Morgan Caltons Request for Production of Documents Set Two is DENIED. Defendant Green Check Verified, Inc.s Request for Joinder to Defendant PayQwick, Inc.s Motion for Protective Order Re: Plaintiff Morgan Caltons Request for Production of Documents Set Two is GRANTED. Defendant Green Check Verified, Inc.s Motion for Protective Order Re: Plaintiff Morgan Caltons Request for Production of Documents Set Two, Request Nos. 63-65 is DENIED. Plaintiff Morgan Caltons Request for Monetary Sanctions against Defendant PayQwick, Inc., Defendant Green Check Verified, Inc. and Counsels Tracy Warren, Yvonne Ricardo, Taylor King, Grace Horoupian, and Tuan Nguyen, jointly and severally, is GRANTED at the reduced amount of $3,400.00. Defendant PayQwick Inc.s Evidentiary Objections are moot as the declaration was not considered relevant in ruling on the motion. Introduction Defendant PayQwick, Inc. (PQ) moved for a Protective Order from Plaintiff Morgan Caltons (Plaintiff) Request for Production of Documents Set Two (RPD), and specifically RPD nos. 50-58. Defendant Green Check Verified (GCV) requested joinder to PQs motion for a protective order as to RPD 50-52, 55-60 served upon GCV. RPDs 50-52 and 55-60 served upon GCV are the same RPDs at issue in PQs motion (i.e., RPD 50-58 served upon PQ.) Because the RPDs are the same in both motions, GCVs request for joinder is merited and GRANTED. Separately but within the same request for joinder, GCV moved for a protective order against RPD 63-65 regarding documents related to financial information. The Court referred to PQ and GCV collectively as Defendants. Plaintiffs Opposition requested sanctions of $10,000.00 against Defendants and their Counsels Tracy Warren, Yvonne Ricardo, Taylor King, Grace Horoupian, and Tuan Nguyen. Timeliness The court reviews the timeliness of filing the motion and the timeliness in serving objections as two distinct deadlines and they will be addressed separately. The court finds the motion to be timely filed BUT finds that the objections to the discovery requests were untimely made. Moving parties cannot base a motion for protective order on objections made for the first time in the motion and after the time had expired to serve objections to the discovery responses. Procedure Plaintiff argued that the motion is untimely and Defendants failed to meet and confer in good faith. However, the motion was filed approximately a month and a half after the RPD was served. The Court finds that the motion was promptly filed because a month and a half is not an unreasonable delay in seeking a protective order. The Court finds that Defendants sufficiently met and conferred in good faith based upon the email exchange and subsequent telephone meeting between the parties. (Tuan Nguyen Decl. 5-7 and Exhs. C and D and Yvonne Ricardo Decl. par. 3, Exh. B.) Plaintiffs objections as to timeliness and lack of a good faith meet and confer are unpersuasive. Discussion The Court for good cause may make an order to protect any party from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 2031.060(b).) Moving parties have the burden to show good cause for protective order. (Emerson Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1101, 1110.) While the discovery statutes give the trial court wide discretion in making such orders as may be necessary to protect parties and deponents from abuse or misuse of depositions there can be no room for the exercise of such discretion if no ground exists upon which it might operate.& If there is no legal justification for such exercise of discretion it must be held that an abuse occurred. (Oak Grove School Dist. v. City Title Insurance Co. (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 678, 712.) Defendants moved for a protective order as to RPD 50-58 as to PQ and RPD 50-52 and 55-60 as to GCV because the requested documents are allegedly irrelevant/will not lead to admissible evidence; an invasion of privacy rights; and overbroad, unduly burdensome, oppressive, and harassing. However, the motion for protective order was not filed until after the time to serve objections to the discovery response had already expired. Preliminarily, Defendants contention that a protective order can be grounded on the objections of relevance/not leading to admissible evidence, privacy, and overbroad are unfounded. These three objections are untimely and thus waived; therefore, they cannot be grounds for a protective order. A failure to object to an inspection demand within the 30-day period to respond waives these grounds for objection. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 2031.300(a).) The RPD was served on May 17, 2024 via electronic service. Defendants time to respond based upon these three objections expired on June 20, 2024. Asserting these three objections in a motion for protective order filed on July 5, 2024 is improper because the objections were waived and not proper grounds for a protective order. Defendants attempt to ground their motion for protective order on the objections of relevance, privacy, and overbroad are not persuasive. Defendants contention that the RPDs are unduly burdensome, oppressive, and harassing also cannot be grounds for this motion for a protective order. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 2031.060(b).) These objections were not timely made. Also, on the merits, it is Defendants burden of proof to show these grounds for a protective order. Defendants failed to present any facts through declaration or affidavit to support their contention. The declaration of Tuan Nguyen and Yvonne Ricardo lack any facts to show that Defendants would be burdened, oppressed, or harassed in having to respond to the RPDs 50-58 and 50-52, 55-60. Defendants failed to meet their burden of proof. Defendants motion for protective order is DENIED as to RPDs 50-58 for PQ and RPDs 50-52 and 55-60 for GCV. GCV then argued that a protective order was required against responding to RPD 63-65 on the objection that the requests violate GCVs privacy rights regarding financial information. GCV argued that Plaintiff was required to make a prima facie case for punitive damages before seeking financial affairs discovery. However, the privacy objection was again required to be timely made. As stated above, a protective order motion is not the proper grounds to assert for the first time a privacy objection. The privacy objection was required to be made prior to the expiration of the time to respond. Because GCV is asserting a privacy objection after the time to respond expired, the objection is waived. GCV did not meet its burden to show a proper ground for a protective order. GCVs motion for protective order as to RPD 63-65 is DENIED. Plaintiff requested sanctions of $10,000 against Defendants and their Counsels Tracy Warren, Yvonne Ricardo, Taylor King, Grace Horoupian, and Tuan Nguyen. Monetary sanctions are mandated unless the losing party can show substantial justification or circ*mstances making sanctions unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., sec 2031.060(h).) Defendants being the unsuccessful parties were required to show substantial justification or circ*mstances making sanctions unjust. Defendants failed to meet their burden. Sanctions are warranted in favor of Plaintiff. However, the request for $10,000 is unreasonable. The opposition to the motions was not labor intensive, did not require any special legal research and is primarily a recitation of the chronology of events, hardly requiring $10,000 of an attorney's time. The Court reduces sanctions to $3,400.00 against Defendants and their counsel, Fisher & Phillips payable by 9/5/2024 to the Client Trust Account of FAIRCHILD & LEVINE LLP, 38 Corporate Park, Irvine, CA 92606. Even so, the motion was signed by only two attorneys (Horoupian and Nguyen) and asking for sanctions personally against the individuals seem particularly harsh. Asking for sanctions against persons who did not sign the motions is overreaching. It is not the practice of this court to assess sanctions against individual attorneys if they are members of a law firm as it is the firm which is counsel of record. The court finds there was no substantial justification for the motion in light of the failure to timely serve objections to the discovery, and because of the lack of facts to support the motion. Plaintiffs request for sanctions is GRANTED but at the reduced amount of $3,400.00. The court will not allow this case to devolve into a war for attorney fees. You are all placed on notice. ____________________________________________________________________________________________ [TENTATIVE] ORDER: Defendant Green Check Verified, Inc.s Motion to Stay and Quash the Deposition of Jonathan Lee as the representative of the Department of Financial Protection and Innovation is GRANTED. Defendant PayQwick, Inc.s Request for Joinder is GRANTED. Introduction Defendant Green Check Verified, Inc. (Defendant or GCV) moved to quash the deposition of Jonathan Lee (Deponent), as the representative of Non-Party Department of Financial Protection and Innovation (DFPI), and /or for a protective order prohibiting Plaintiff Morgan Calton (Plaintiff) from enforcing the subpoena. Alternatively, Defendant requested the Court to modify the subpoena to request only documents in Deponents possession, custody, or control reflecting any documents that include reference to Plaintiff. Defendant PayQwick, Inc. (PayQwick) requested joinder to the instant motion. Non-party DFPI filed a brief in support of the instant motion. Procedure The deposition subpoena is procedurally defective because it sought to depose an entity, DFPI, but then it expressly named the deponent from the DFPI to be deposed, Jonathon Lee. Subpoenas directed to an entity make the entity the deponent, not a specific person. It is the entity who determines the person most qualified to testify on its behalf regarding the topics listed in the subpoena. (Code Civ. Proc., secs. 2025.230 and 2020.310(e).) On this defect alone, there is good cause to quash and stay the subpoena. However, the Court reviewed the substantive arguments presented in the briefs. Discussion A court may modify or quash a subpoena entirely or partially, and issue an order to protect parties, witnesses or consumers from unreasonable or oppressive demands including violations of privacy. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1987.1.) Courts may also enter protective orders limiting depositions. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 2025.240(b).) Moving parties have the burden to show good cause for protective orders. (Emerson Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1101, 1110.) The Third Amended Complaint (TAC) alleged that DFPI required GCV to not make material changes to PayQwicks business operations, including terminating PayQwicks employees, in connection with the merger and DFPI conditioned the merger upon the prohibition related to termination of employees. (TAC pars. 33-35.) The first four topics relate to GCVs acquisition of PayQwick and DFPIs regulatory actions over the acquisition. The fifth and sixth topics revolve around an August 18, 2023 Order issued by DFPI. Defendant argued that the subpoena is unreasonable and/or irrelevant and will not lead to admissible evidence because the basis for the demand, as alleged in the TAC, is unfounded. Defendant disputed that DFPIs August 18, 2023 Order conditioned GCVs acquisition of PayQwick or prohibited GCV from terminating PayQwick employees. The statutes dictating the authority of the DFPI provide that DFPIs commissioner cannot approve an application to acquire a licensee if [t]he applicant's plans, if any, to make any major change in the business, corporate structure, or management of the licensee are not detrimental to the safety and soundness of the licensee. (Fin. Code, sec. 2035(b)(4).) Plaintiffs contention that the phrase make any major change in the business is interpreted to mean changes in staffing levels. However, Plaintiff presented no legal authority to show that business is the equivalent of staffing level. This statute is within the Money Transmission Act (Fin. Code, secs. 2000 et seq) and the Act sought to regulate the business of money transmissions. (Fin. Code, secs. 2001 and 2002.) As such, the Court interpreted Financial Code, section 2035(b)(4) so as to authorize the commissioner to deny an application if the applicant made a major change in the licensees business of money transmission and not staffing levels. Plaintiffs citation to Financial Code, section 2035(b)(4) to support the subpoena topics is found to be unreasonable. Plaintiff argued that the August 18, 2023 Order was also grounds to show that DFPI prohibited the termination of PayQwick employees. The DFPI is authorized to issue orders directing compliance with any law or discontinue illegal practices or discontinue any unsafe or injurious practices. (Fin. Code, sec. 2148(a).) Under the authority to issue such orders, DFPI issued the August 18, 2023 Order, which provided: Within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order, Respondent shall complete an assessment of its staffing needs and increase the staff level if needed to ensure business continuity in case of departure of personnel. (See DFPI Brief, Exh. A, par. 8.) A plain reading of the August 18, 2023 Order shows that Plaintiffs contention is unsupported by facts. The August 18, 2023 Order did not condition the acquisition/merger on retaining PayQwicks employees (or more specifically, non-managerial employees). Plaintiff misinterpreted the August 18, 2023 Order. The Order merely required GCV to assess their staffing needs and increase staffing levels if needed. Nothing in the August 18, 2023 Order prohibited the termination of employees or conditioned the merger/acquisition upon retention of PayQwicks employees. Plaintiffs reliance upon the August 18, 2023 Order is unreasonable to support the demands in the subpoena. The Court finds Defendants arguments persuasive. Plaintiff argued that the topics in the subpoena are based upon allegations found in another action filed by Cynthia Galas. However, allegations in a separate action are irrelevant to the issues presented in Plaintiffs TAC and discovery that stems from the claims made in Plaintiffs TAC. Arguments related to Cynthia Galas Complaint are unpersuasive. Plaintiff argued that they narrowed the scope of the topics during meet and confer meetings. However, even if Plaintiff narrowed the topics to limit the discovery to information regarding a DFPI directive, regulatory order, or expectation that it would not effectuate a plan to terminate all personnel. However, as reviewed above, DFPI is not seen to have any authority to issue such a directive, order, or expectation to control plans to terminate employees. The offer to narrow the scope of the topics is insufficient to enforce the subpoena. The Court further notes that the topics identified in the subpoena are broad in scope and a plain reading of the topics shows that the questioning of the deponent could include discussions of confidential/private or privileged information or trade secrets. However, without privilege logs or additional admissible facts, any review of these objections would be speculative and rulings would be in the abstract. Arguments related to confidentiality, privacy, trade secret, and privilege are unpersuasive. In any event, the topics in the subpoena are found to be unreasonable and the motion to quash and stay enforcement of the subpoena is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED, CLERK TO GIVE NOTICE.

Ruling

Alexis Ruiz Gonzalez vs California Sun Grower Services Company, LLC, et al.

Aug 19, 2024 |21CV-00190

21CV-00190 Alexis Ruiz Gonzalez v. California Sun Grower Services CompanyCase Management ConferenceAppearance required. Remote appearances are permitted. Parties who wish to appearremotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to arrange for a remoteappearance. Appear to address the status of claims under that the PAGA claim whichthe parties are reported to have settled.

Ruling

Churpries Parker, individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated, and as an aggrieved employee pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") vs MCDCC II, L.P., a California limited partnership et al.

Aug 13, 2024 |STK-CV-UOE-2023-0003138

On the Court’s own motion, the Court COTINUES the hearing on Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order to September 26, 2024 at 9:00 am. No further briefing is allowed, without leave of court. Blanca A. Bañuelos Judge of the Superior Court of California

Ruling

DELORES SIMPSON VS LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, ET AL.

Aug 19, 2024 |22PSCV01193

Case Number: 22PSCV01193 Hearing Date: August 19, 2024 Dept: G Defendant County of Los Angeless Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, for Summary Adjudication of Issues as to Causes of Action Reconsidered by Court after Hearing on July 18, 2024 Respondent: Plaintiff Delores Plaintiff TENTATIVE RULING The Court intends to set a briefing schedule so that Defendant County of Los Angeles may formally provide additional argument as to Plaintiffs First Cause of Action for Race-Based Harassment and Ninth Cause of Action for Failure to Prevent Harassment and Discrimination. The Court also intends to set a briefing schedule so that Plaintiff may formally provide additional argument as to Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action for Racial Discrimination and Fifth Cause of Action for Age Discrimination. BACKGROUND This is an action for employment discrimination and harassment. In 1985, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) hired Plaintiff Delores Plaintiff and promoted Plaintiff to childrens social worker in 1990. From 2020 to 2022, Plaintiff alleges DCFS supervisors harassed and discriminated against Plaintiff based on age, disability, and race. When Plaintiff reported their conduct, Plaintiff alleges they retaliated with further harassment, false allegations of misconduct, disciplinary actions and workload adjustments. On October 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against DCFS, the County of Los Angeles (the County), and Does 1-50, alleging the following causes of action: (1) harassment based on race, (2) harassment based on age, (3) harassment based on physical disability, (4) racial discrimination, (5) age discrimination, (6) physical disability discrimination, (7) failure to engage in the interactive process, (8) failure to make reasonable accommodation, (9) failure to prevent discrimination and harassment, (10) retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), (11) retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 98.6, and (12) whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. On April 25, 2024, the parties stipulated to dismiss Plaintiffs eleventh cause of action, request for punitive damages, and request for prejudgment interest. On May 3, 2024, the County and DCFS (collectively, the County) filed the present motion for summary judgment or adjudication. On May 7, 2024, the County refiled its motion with additions and corrections. A hearing on the present motion is set for July 18, 2024, along with a case management conference/status conference re: ADR. DISCUSSION In considering the oral arguments made by the County at the initial hearing on July 18, 2024, the court seeks additional briefing as to the Countys arguments that summary judgment should be granted as to the First and Ninth Causes of Action. Specifically, the court will permit additional briefing so that Defendant may address all of Plaintiffs race-based harassment allegations. To this end, the court will permit the County to file a supplemental separate statement that provides the appropriate support for the Countys position that no triable issues of material fact exist as to the First and Ninth Causes of Action. The court will provide Plaintiff an opportunity to oppose the Countys supplemental briefing and supplemental separate statement. The court also seeks additional briefing from Plaintiff regarding the Plaintiffs arguments that triable issues of material fact exist as to the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action. Specifically, the court will permit additional briefing so that Plaintiff may supplement its arguments related to its claims of racial discrimination and age discrimination. To this end, the court will permit Plaintiff to file a supplemental separate statement that provides the appropriate support for Plaintiffs position that triable issues of material fact exist as to the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action. The court will provide Defendant an opportunity to oppose the Plaintiffs supplemental briefing and supplemental separate statement. The court and the parties will discuss and agree upon a briefing schedule at the hearing on August 19.

Ruling

John Doe vs Norman's Nursery Inc et al

Tentative not yet posted, please check again.

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Janeya Thomas vs Intuit Inc et al

Aug 14, 2024 |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |24CV445204

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David Tovar vs Windsor Property Management Company

Aug 14, 2024 |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |24CV445199

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William Thompson vs Interstate Equities Corporation, a California Corporation et al

Aug 16, 2024 |Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36) |Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36) |24CV445302

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William Thompson vs Interstate Equities Corporation, a California Corporation et al

Aug 16, 2024 |Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36) |Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36) |24CV445302

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Stapleton v. Dariotis Group Restaurants, Inc. (Class Action)

Aug 08, 2024 |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |24CV444819

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Janeya Thomas vs Intuit Inc et al

Aug 14, 2024 |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |24CV445204

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Drake Schmitt vs Maxar Space LLC et al

Aug 15, 2024 |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |Other Employment Unlimited (15) |24CV445243

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Gouri Jha vs Suzanne Winter et al

Aug 16, 2024 |Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36) |Wrongful Termination Unlimited(36) |24CV445312